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I. INTRODUCION
Each year, hundreds of thousands of children languish in foster or insti-
tutional care worldwide,' while at the same time, thousands of adults,
married and unmarried alike, are denied children: because of
"shortages."2 How did this tragedy occur, and why does it continue to be
repeated daily in countries around the world? The unfortunate truth is
that many of the legal and societal norms now in place effectively prohibit
needy children from finding suitable homes. While potential parents in
Western countries cry out for babies of their own, millions of children live
in physical and psychological poverty in underfunded orphanages around
the world' and governments refuse to recognize the problems inherent in
the current methods of intercountry adoption.
The problems with the present system are rooted in its traditional and
highly paternalistic approach to children's rights. For years, courts and
children's advocates have claimed to be working in the best interest of
the child.4 Regardless of the fact, however, that it is in everyone's best
interest to place children in homes where they are wanted as soon as
possible, many children are still trapped within the child care system.
One problem is that, for the most part, judicial procedures designed to
protect children focus almost exclusively on infants,5 despite the fact that
infants are not the 'only ones who need homes. Older children are
equally in need of adoption. Although they are not as likely as infants to
be adopted6 either inside or outside their home country,7 certainly the
1 Margaret Liu, International Adoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
LJ. 187, 187 (1994).
2 Id. at 190.
3 Howard E. Bogard, Comment, Who Are the Orphans?: Defining Orphan Status
and the Need for an International Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 5 EMORY
INT'L L. Rv. 571, 574-75 (1991).
4 Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 11, 54 (1994). However, family law often
ignores the child's needs and perspective despite its rhetoric. Id. at 15.
5 By making blanket assumptions about the inability of children to make decisions
for themselves, the courts protect infants while trampling on the rights of older, more
mature children. ld. at 30. For example, the United States Supreme Court has said
that restrictions on juveniles' constitutional rights are permissible as long as there is
no undue burden. Baird v. Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622, 634, 640 (1979). That Court also
recognized the arbitrary and artificial nature of a fixed age of majority but refused to
address the issue. Id. at 633 n.12, 643 n.22.
6 Most people prefer to adopt infants. Liu, supra note 1, at 190.
7 Although there are no firm statistics regarding the ages of children who are (or
could be, if the legal reforms suggested herein were implemented) involved in
intercountry adoption, anecdotal evidence suggests a significant number are between
the ages of four and fourteen. See Arthur Golden, In Peru: Help for a Few Children
- San Diegan Aids Victims of War, Want, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 5, 1993, at
Al (commenting on the high number of older Peruvian street children); Donatella
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increasing number of older children available for adoption suggests the
need to address their particular concerns.' By addressing the needs of
older children, we can reduce the total number of children trapped in the
morass of institutional care. For example, far too many infants and tod-
dlers must wait months or years to become eligible for adoption. All chil-
dren (either on their own or through guardians ad litem) can use the
procedures advocated herein for older children to make themselves avail-
able for adoption. The end result will be one everyone can agree upon:
more children in homes of their own.
However, before society will accept the changes suggested herein, it
first must understand the reasons why adoption into a family is crucial to
a child's development and why institutionalization and foster care are
insufficient and temporary solutions to the problem. Part II of this Arti-
cle looks at the statistical evidence and psycho-social theories concerning
adoption and analyzes the legal traditions surrounding both domestic and
intercountry adoption. Part II concludes that if children are to be served
properly, the international community must promote the adoption of
children, even if it means prioritizing adoption outside the home country
over foster care inside the home country. The second step comes after
the restrictions on domestic and intercountry adoption have been loos-
ened. At that point, children themselves must be empowered to make
some of the decisions regarding their futures. Part III looks at the cur-
rent status of children's rights, especially with regard to how and when
children can choose the families in which they live. If we are to serve
children's needs adequately, international organizations must advocate
giving children the power to make their own decisions. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the current rights of children to voice their opinions about
intercountry adoption and suggests what measures should be taken by the
international community to enforce these sorts of rights in the future.
Lorch, Ugandan Orphans Survive on Own After Parents Die of AIDS; Many Children
Stay on Farmland in Nation Struggling with Disease, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Mar.
21, 1993 (Bulldog ed.), at 22A (suggesting the rising number of older Ugandan
orphans is due to loss of parents to AIDS); Carol J. Williams, Postscript: Orphans
Continue to Haunt Romania, L.A. TiMns, Oct. 6, 1992, at 5 (noting continued
institutionalization of older Romanian orphans).
8 See supra text accompanying note 7. The fact that international conventions on
intercountry adoption contain some special provisions for older children points to the
probability that older children are, in fact, being adopted despite the lack of statistical
evidence. See, e.g., Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, art. 4(d)(1), 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993)
[hereinafter Convention on Intercountry Adoption].
1995]
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II. ADOPTION
A. Legal Bases for Adoption
For years, the international community, as well as virtually every
national government, has advocated special care, guidance, and protec-
tion for children.' Since colonial times, American children have been
entitled to the necessities of life, including protection from abuse and the
opportunity to start a life of their own.'0 Many countries recognize simi-
lar entitlements. However, not all children enjoy even these bare essen-
tials of life; millions around the world live in varying levels of physical
and emotional deprivation."
Traditionally, the family was responsible for the care and upbringing of
children, with the state deferring to parental judgment in most matters.' 2
Parents did not need to raise their children in their own home to retain
parental authority, however. In the seventeenth century it was common
for children to be placed in other households to work and be educated.'
Today, it is far less common for children with responsible parents to be
raised outside their natural home, but it can happen.
The state relies on its parens patriae powers to intervene in domestic
matters when there are custody disputes, foster care issues, or acts of
juvenile delinquency. 14 The court may also become involved when there
9 See 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 1 U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter 1989
Convention]; Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N.
GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 19, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A14354 (1959). American
statutory protection is found on the federal level in the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 620 (1991). However, most family and
adoption law is generally deemed to be a matter of state concern. See Liu, supra note
1, at 201 & n.119.
10 JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF
ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION 1 (1991). In addition, some level of education was
required so that the children, when grown, would not be a burden to the family,
community, or government. See id. at 1-2.
11 Bogard, supra note 3, at 574-75. An estimated 38,000 American children live
without these essentials of life. Id. at 573. Millions of others suffer through hunger,
prostitution, abuse, and even murder. Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 15.
12 Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation - The Proper
Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
423, 427 (1993).
13 HAWES, supra note 10, at 6. In those days, most people were farmers, and
children were needed to assist with the farm work. Id. Because most labor was
gender-specific, families sometimes needed a different mix of girls and boys than had
occurred in the natural family and took in children to meet that need. Id.
34 Hafen, supra note 12, at 427. These state powers of intervention are not a recent
development; they stretch back to at least the seventeenth century. HAWES, supra
note 10, at 6; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 16 (regarding parental and state
authority over children).
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is parental misconduct, such as abuse or neglect.15 In addition, some
commentators have recognized a nascent right of judicial intervention
when a child seeks the courts' assistance in exercising an individual right
based on actions not connected with parental misconduct.16
Orphans present special problems to the state. 7 Normally, the state
prefers to place orphans with family members.' 8 However, there are
times when no family members are available to take the child. In these
cases, the child may be placed in an orphanage or in foster care on a
temporary basis. Once a child is taken from his or her home, there are
three placement options. Ideally, orphanages should be used only for a
brief time while the child is waiting to be placed in foster care or adoptive
homes.' 9 Because foster care provides some of the benefits of family life,
it is better for the child's emotional well being than institutionalization,
but placement in a foster home should not preclude adoption.20 Adop-
tion is the best choice for most children, although it can be the most diffi-
cult to achieve, especially with older or special-needs children.2'
B. Placement Opportunities for Orphans: Adoption as the Best Choice
Although each case should be decided on its own merits, juvenile
courts and other state actors should follow a preferential ranking of alter-
native care options when intervening in child placement matters. First,
children should not be removed from their homes unless there is an ade-
15 Hafen, supra note 12, at 427.
16 Id at 427-28. The right to abortion or First Amendment rights might be
included in this category. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-13 (1969).
17 "Orphans," as used here, applies both to children whose parents are dead and to
children whose parents are alive but unable or unwilling to take responsibility for
their care. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73 for a discussion of legal
abandonment.
18 See HAWEs, supra note 10, at 7 (citing historical preference); see also 1986
United Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection
and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption
Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, 41 U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No.
53, at 265 arts. 3-4, U.N. Doc. 41/85 (1986) [hereinafter Declaration on Children].
19 Bogard, supra note 3, at 576-77.
20 Id at 577-78.
21 See id. at 579-80. Some commentators have accepted the need for
institutionalization in the case of mentally or physically handicapped children, but
more recent discussions have found merit in placing all but the most severely affected
children in family environments. Id. at 577 & n.33; cf. U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L
ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, REPORT OF AN EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON
ADOPTION AND FOSTER PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN at 2, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/99, U.N.
Sales No. E.80.IV.1 (1980).
1995]
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quate reason for doing so.2 2 The most often-quoted rationale for removal
is that it is in the best interest of the child.23 Some child developmental-
ists have debated whether this is always the case. In some circumstances,
developmentalists have concluded that removal may not be in the best
interest of the child, psychologically speaking. For instance, there is the
problem of whether a child has formed emotionally bonded relationships
at the time of removal; if a child has not yet formed such an attachment,
his or her ability to do so is affected throughout life.24
There are other problems with using a best interest standard. For
example, some commentators have noted that prior to making a removal
decision a court may be virtually uninformed about the child's history or
future placement options. Decisions made in such circumstances cannot
be logically said to be in the child's best interest.25 Even if the court does
have the necessary information, predictions of how a child will react to
removal are unreliable. 26 For these reasons, many experts advocate
keeping a child in a familiar environment for as long as possible.
Once removal is indicated, the state must decide how to care for the
child. For the most part, adoption is seen as the best alternative, when it
is available. Foster care is the next best option, while life in an orphanage
is viewed as the least attractive alternative. Regardless of the benefits of
foster and adoptive care, children who are removed from their homes
often spend at least some time in a group care situation. Experts agree
that in these cases, institutionalization should last only as long as is neces-
sary.27 Even the most nurturing orphanage cannot replace the emotional
22 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND PROTECTION CASES 193 (1993). Physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse are commonly accepted reasons for removing a child
from his or her home, but parental neglect or the inability to provide for the child's
basic needs can also constitute an adequate reason for removal.
2 Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 53-56; Liu, supra note 1, at 189; see also Convention
on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, arts. 1, 21(1).
24 HARALAMBIE, supra note 22, at 193. One example of when a best interests
analysis might require a child to remain at home would be when a child is
malnourished because his or her parents cannot afford to provide a proper diet. If
this child has not yet formed emotional bonds, he or she would be better served by
the state's providing supplemental nutrition at home rather than by forced removal to
an institution, for although the child would be sure to receive adequate nutrition at
the institution, it would come at the cost of his or her emotional well-being. The
situation would be different, of course, if, even after governmental intervention, the
child was found to be receiving an inadequate diet due to parental misconduct.
25 HAWES, supra note 10, at 102.
26 1d There is a high incidence of runaways in the foster care system. Kevin M.
Ryan, Stemming the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: A Due Process Perspective, 42
CATS. U. L. REv. 271, 271 (1993).
27 Bogard, supra note 3, at 576.
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and social bonds that are formed within a family unit.' Child develop-
mentalists are not the only ones who believe children need families. Vari-
ous legal bodies have also recognized the right and need of a child to
grow up in a family environment.2 9
Foster care is often considered an appropriate alternative to institution-
alization of orphans, but it too is unable to meet all of the physical and
emotional needs of children.3" For instance, a child may not be able to
form significant emotional bonds while in foster care due to the uncer-
tainty of the duration of the placement and the probability of successive
foster homes.3" With each new home, a child becomes less able to trust.3 2
In America, the federal government has recognized the inadequacy of
foster care and forced child welfare agencies to specify permanent plans
for a foster child's placement after a certain amount of time has passed.33
However, that is not always the case in other countries.34 Despite the
shortcomings of the foster care system, the United Nations has given
preference to domestic foster care over intercountry adoption.35
After reviewing other options, adoption appears to be the best alterna-
tive for children who are left without proper homes of their own.36 Only
2 HARALAMBIE, supra note 22, at 192.
29 Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, pmbl.; see 42 U.S.C. § 675;
see, e.g., Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax, 775 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Va. 1991) (noting the
purpose of child welfare legislation is to restrict foster care in favor of permanent
placement).
30 Ryan, supra note 26, at 281 & n.44 (noting foster care can be harmful if used for
more than short periods of time).
31 HARALAMBIE, supra note 22, at 193; see also HAWES, supra note 10, at 103;
Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Report Finds the Limbo of Foster Care is Growing Longer, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at B1.
32 HARALAMBE, supra note 22, at 193. Some child development experts have
based their opinions regarding the inadequacy of foster care on the concept of
"psychological parenting," or the day to day interaction of an adult with a child that
fulfills the emotional and physical needs of the child. See HAWEs, supra note 10, at
103-04 (discussing the theories of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit,
leaders in child advocacy issues).
33 See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 620 (1991);
see also HARALAMBIE, supra note 22, at 193; Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 63, 67.
However, one recent report suggests that the Child Welfare Administration
guidelines are not being followed in a number of cases. Prez-Pefia, supra note 31, at
B1, B9 (citing cases where adoptable children remained in foster care for up to five
years).
34 See, e.g., Declaration on Children, supra note 18.
36 1989 Convention, supra note 9, art. 21(b); Declaration on Children, supra note
18, art. 18; see also Ahilemah Jonet, International Baby Selling for Adoption and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 82,
93 (1989); cf. Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, pmbl.
36 Bogard, supra note 3, at 579, 582; but cf. HARALAMBIE, supra note 22, at 193
(arguing adoption may not be in the best interest of all children).
1995]
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adoption gives a child the loving, permanent home that is necessary to
meet that child's physical and emotional needs. Adoption is not without
its problems, however. In some cases, an older child must give his or her
consent prior to adoption proceedings. 7 Even if consent is not legally
required, a child's wishes should be considered because a successful adop-
tion is unlikely without the child's cooperation.8
C. Intercountry Adoption
1. The Need for Intercountry Adoption
At first, adoptions were so rare that adoption law was of only domestic
concern. 9 However, the demand for healthy babies in Western countries
has grown to -the point that internal adoption alone cannot meet the
need.' Observers have pointed to higher rates of contraception, abor-
tion, and single parenthood as reasons why there are fewer babies avail-
able in these countries.4 On the other hand, a number of lesser
developed countries have an excess of orphans, due to the stigma of ille-
gitimacy, absence of contraception and abortion services, and govern-
mental instability.42 Recent events such as the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the famine in Somalia, and the AIDS epidemic in Uganda
have increased the number of older children, as well as the number of
infants, available for adoption.43 The United Nations has recognized the
37 In the United States, numerous state adoption laws require consent from the
child if he or she is over a certain age, although a judge who finds good cause may
override the child's opinion. HARALAMBIE, supra note 22, at 197. International law
also recognizes the need for consent of the child in certain instances. Convention on
Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, art. 4(d)(1).
38 HARALAMBiE, supra note 22, at 197-98.
39 Id
40 See David Todd, Children New Commodity in Red-Hot World Market,
VANCOUVER SU1'r, Oct. 1, 1991, at F4; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, International
Adoption: Overview, in ADOPTION LAW PRACTICE 10.02[2] (J. Hollinger ed., 1988);
Liu, supra note 1. at 190.
41 Liu, supra note 1, at 190; Todd, supra note 40.
42 See Bart Eisenberg, Road to Foreign Adoptions Gets Rockier, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 28, 1990, at 13. The recent outbreaks of war in Eastern Europe have
been one highly-publicized cause of large numbers of orphans, although the ravages
of war have often been a reason for intercountry adoption. See Claude Forrell,
Australia: A Strong Case for Ending Intercountry Adoption, REuTER TEXTLINE, Sept.
18, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
43 See Kids Flee Bosnia During War's Lull" More Than 100 Children Are Evacuated
to Italy as a Serbian Leader Vows to Back a Truce, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRiB., July 19,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File; Lorch, supra note 7; Keith
B. Richburg, Legacy of Woe Awaits "Lost Generation" of Somalia, WASH. POST, Sept.
13, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File; see also Liu, supra note 1,
at 87-89. In these types of situations, where entire societies are in chaos due to health
crises or civil war, intercountry adoption may be the only hope for orphans. When
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need to place some of these third world children in homes outside of their
native countries, but that solution has met some resistance from the send-
ing states (states which send children out to other countries) who per-
ceive such procedures as "imperialistic.""
Intercountry adoption is not without its disadvantages. There may be
some problem of acceptance of a foreign-born child in the community
where he or she is to be placed.4" Integration may be more difficult if the
adoption is trans-racial or transethnic.1 In addition, critics note that the
isolation and insecurity on the part of the adoptee can be multiplied when
he or she is taken from a familiar culture,4 7 and the child may be curious
about his or her religious, ethnic, genetic, and cultural heritage.4" How-
ever, these emotions are similar to those felt by children adopted within
their own country and race.49 In addition, the conscious "culture shock"
that many point to as a reason to limit intercountry adoption will not
occur if the child is adopted as an infant. It is even possible that some
older children will recognize that life will be different in another country,
families can barely survive themselves, they are not likely to open their hearts and
homes to additional children.
44 Bogard, supra note 3, at 580-81.
45 See id at 582; see also Forrell, supra note 42.
46 See Bogard, supra note 3, at 582 & n.63. There has been extensive discussion of
trans-racial adoption, some of which contains valid concerns about the welfare of the
child and some of which seems more concerned with perceived racism or systemic
injustice than with the welfare of an individual child. For a general discussion of these
concerns, see Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of
Race Matching, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, n.5 (1991); Timothy P. Glynn, The Role of
Race in Adoption Proceedings: A Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference
Statute, 77 MINN. L. RPv. 925, n.4 (1993); Martin Mears, Adoption, Bigotry and Race,
NEw L.J. 452 (1990). Without going into the particular theories for and against trans-
racial adoption, it seems logical to conclude that adoption within the same race is
preferable since adjustment will be easier for the child, but should not preclude
adoption elsewhere. As with intercountry adoption, the problems associated with
orphanages and long-term foster care seem much more disadvantageous to a child
than the adjustment problems associated with trans-racial adoption into a family that
has been sensitized to potential problems. See Eisenberg, supra note 42 (a parent
noting "You don't just adopt a child.... You must also, in a sense, adopt the country
itself."). The volatility of the trans-racial adoption dilemma is illustrated by the case
of one British woman who was told, "It would be better for that child to die in the
arms of its blood brothers than to be brought up here." Barbara Simpson, U.K: Red
Tape Rebels - The Controversy Over Intercountry Adoption, REUTER TExTLiNE,
Feb. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
47 Bogard, supra note 3, at 582. This concern will obviously only affect older
children.
48 Id.
49 HARALAMBIE, supra note 22, at 202-04.
1995]
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yet still want to leave their native lands.50 This is not to say that internal
adoptions are not preferable to intercountry adoption; internal adoption
is undoubtedly the best possible solution to the orphan problem. How-
ever, if the adoptee is willing to leave or is an infant,5 ' the disadvantages
to the child52 of intercountry adoption are slight when compared to the
disadvantages of living in an institution or in a series of foster homes.53
Despite some legitimate concerns, the fact is that many children who
have been adopted into different countries actually fare very well. 4
2. The Legal History of Intercountry Adoption
Intercountry adoption has had a dubious history.55 Bureaucratic red
tape has taken its toll on parents and children alike, forcing some well-
meaning but frustrated adoptive parents to resort to illegal means to get
adoptive children out of their native lands.56 Concerns about baby bro-
kering (the purchase of infants from biological parents or corrupt govern-
ment officials) have led some third-world countries to tighten their laws
regarding intercountry adoption.57 In India, for example, the Supreme
Court enumerated a list of guidelines which requires non-domestic pro-
spective parents to be sponsored by a government-recognized agency that
50 Bogard, supra note 3, at 571-72. These children may not be aware of the
differences between their homeland and their adoptive land, or may have an
unrealistic view of other countries, but their desire to leave should not be discounted
if their wishes remain the same after full disclosure of the realities of life in their
prospective new home. In addition, the procedures now in place for intercountry
adoption require the adoptive parents to be identified prior to adoption procedures
being initiated in either country, so the child is able to meet the prospective parents
and learn about his or her new home in great detail before giving his or her consent to
the adoption. See infra part II.C.2 for a discussion of intercountry adoption
procedures.
51 The differences between adoption of infants and older children will be discussed
in part IV.
52 Here again, the best interest of the individual child may be confused with the
perceived best interest of the country, as when government officials resist
intercountry adoption due to fears of "imperialism" and declines in population. See
supra note 44 and infra note 142 and accompanying text.
53 Although foster care can consist of a single long-term placement, it is more
common for children to be bumped from one home to another, adding to their
feelings of loss and isolation.
54 See Liu, supra note 1, at 193 & n.60.
55 See id. at 191-93.
56 Carroll Bogert, Bringing Back Baby, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1994, at 78; Elizabeth
Grice, A Baby? You Must be Joking, Dear, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July
14, 1993, at 15; see also Liu, supra note 1, at 194; Simpson, supra note 46.
67 See Eisenberg, supra note 42; Rita Sebastian, Children: Sri Lanka to Plug
Loopholes in Adoption Law, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 13, 1991, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File; Alessandra Stanley, Nationalism Slows
Foreign Adoptions in Russia, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 8, 1994, at Al, A12.
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provides pre-adoption screening and ongoing supervision until the adop-
tion is complete.58 The Court felt these provisions would both protect
children and avoid baby-brokering problems. 9 Concerns about the
safety of adoptive children and the suitability of prospective parents have
led the governments of Western nations to restrict entry visas and adop-
tion procedures as well.60
However, despite the troubles that have plagued its past, it seems logi-
cal that once concerns about baby brokering and the suitability of pro-
spective parents are met, intercountry adoption should be viewed as a
viable opportunity for orphaned children. Governments on both sides of
the adoption process should smooth the way for legitimate adoptions,
since it is truly in the best interest of the child and the parent that the
legal aspects of the adoption not increase the emotional anxiety and dura-
tion of an already arduous event. However, the legal standards put into
place by the various countries work against the possibility of adoption,
even when all parties are willing. Leaving cultural bias against intercoun-
try adoption aside, the two key legal problems with the national systems
hinge on the definition of a child as an orphan and with the requirement
that the adoption be legally valid in both the sending and the receiving
country.6 '
A child may be adopted in the child's native country or in the country
of the prospective parents.62 The child's native country, which is often
referred to as the sending state, determines whether the child is to be
adopted at home or abroad.63 Under either method, the child must be
legally free to be adopted in both countries before the procedure takes
58 Laxmi Kant Pande v. Union of India, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 469; see also Laxmi
Kant Pande v. Union of India, 1986 A.I.R. (S.C.) 272 (elaborating on guidelines);
Laxmi Kant Pande v. Union of India, 1987 A.I.R. (S.C.) 232 (elaborating on
guidelines); Nimala Pandit, Inter-Country Adoption: The Indian View, in
PARENTHOOD IN A MODERN SOCIETY: LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TwENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 267, 268-73 (John Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic eds., 1993). These
guidelines are similar to those in the Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra
note 8, arts. 5, 9, 21. However, unlike the United Nations, the Indian government
recognizes the need for prompt action in placing a child, and allows the child to be
eligible for intercountry adoption after he or she has had one month of exclusive
domestic eligibility. Pandit, supra, at 271.
59 See Pandit, supra note 58, at 268-69.
60 The United Kingdom has traditionally been one of the most difficult
bureaucracies for adoptive parents to navigate. See Cassandra Jardine, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 24, 1991, at 11; Simpson, supra note 46. American federal law also
requires prospective parents to meet stringent financial, mental, and moral standards.
Liu, supra note 1, at 207.
61 Bogard, supra note 3, at 583.
62 Id. at 584.
63 Id.
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place.6" Unfortunately, every country has different standards for deter-
mining when a child is legally free to be adopted ("orphaned"), thus cre-
ating numerous problems.65 The two key issues in almost every adoption
statute for defining when a child is orphaned are consent and
abandonment.'
Consent to adoption must be in a form recognized by both the sending
and receiving countries before it will be valid.67 Consent may come from
any of the following: "(1) both biological parents, (2) an unmarried bio-
logical mother, (3) the father of an illegitimate child, (4) a step-father, (5)
a parent whose spouse is deceased or not available, (6) a guardian, (7) an
agency responsible for the child, or (8) the child if over a certain age." 68
Each country has its own standards for sufficiency of consent. Problems
occur when consent is valid in one of the two countries but not the
other.69
Abandonment is the second crucial element in intercountry adoption
proceedings. Abandonment is usually defined as a voluntary act which
includes the intent to abandon, as well as the physical surrender of paren-
tal duties.7" Proof of abandonment precludes the need for parental con-
sent. The United States breaks abandonment into two types, conditional
and unconditional, but only recognizes the latter as a legitimate predeces-
sor to adoption.71 Although the term is not specifically defined, uncondi-
tional abandonment apparently does not exist if the parent intends to
return to the child at any time in the future. Essentially, the child can be
deserted for any length of time, but until "parental rights are formally
relinquished or the parents are divested of their rights in a legal proceed-
6 Id. If a child does not meet the standards of adoption in both countries, the
process will be terminated, even if it is partially completed. See Olga A. Dyuzheva,
Adoption and the Abandonment of Children in the Former Soviet Union, in
PARENTHOOD IN A MODERN SOCIETY: LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY, supra note 58, at 235, 237 (citing conflict of laws problems in
intercountry adoptions of Russian children by American adoptive parents). For
adoption requirements for American parents and children from Korea, Ecuador, and
Romania, see Liu, supra note 1, at 191-99, 202.
65 See Bogard, supra note 3, at 584.
66 Id at 584-85.
67 Id at 585.
68 Id
69 Id.; see Dyuzheva, supra note 64, at 237.
70 Bogard, supra note 3, at 586.
71 Id. The exacting American definition of abandonment has not only hurt the
chances for foreign-born children to be adopted here, but also has relegated hundreds
of thousands of American children into a state of permanent unadoptability. Liu,
supra note 1, at 206 & n.174.
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ing," the child is unable to be adopted in the United States.72 This fluke
in American adoption law has been blamed as one of the reasons for the
extensive baby brokering that occurred in Romania; parents of children
who had been de facto but not de jure abandoned would offer to give up
their parental rights to the highest bidder.73
The result of these international legal discrepancies is a decrease in
intercountry adoptions.74 For example, if the adoption is valid in the
sending country but not in the receiving country, the child will not be
given an immigration visa, and will also become unadoptable in his or her
home country because parents have been found.75 On the other hand, if
the adoption is valid in the receiving country but not in the sending coun-
try and the child is somehow allowed to immigrate, the adoption will
become void and the child will face deportation.76 Finally, for those pro-
spective parents who abide wholly by the law, insurmountable legal diffi-
culties may force them to cease attempts to adopt a child from a certain
sending state, thus lessening the possibilities for adoption for children of
that state.77 For example, Russian law finds legal abandonment to have
occurred after a six months' absence by the parents. 78 Since U.S. law
does not recognize a mere absence of six months as legal abandonment,
American citizens cannot adopt Russian children who fall into this cate-
gory.79 The problem is exacerbated by the refusal of Russian authorities
to attempt to obtain signatures from parents indicating formal abandon-
ment (a process which would allow American citizens to adopt Russian
children) since there is no need to do so under their domestic system.
The reason for the difference between American and Russian
approaches is that the Russian system was devised with the primary
emphasis on the welfare of the children, not of the parents.8 0 The current
American system, which requires formal abandonment or legal adjudica-
72 Bogard, supra note 3, at 586. See id. at 596-603 for a more lengthy discussion of
American statutory problems concerning intercountry adoption; see also Liu, supra
note 1, at 208-10 (analyzing the laws of various American states).
73 Bogard, supra note 3, at n.62.
74 ld. at 586-89; see also Bogert, supra note 56, at 79 (regarding restrictive
American procedures).
7r Bogard, supra note 3, at 587-88.
76 Id- at 588-89.
77 Id; Liu, supra note 1, at 207.
78 Dyuzheva, supra note 64, at 237. Russian family law is currently in a state of
flux, and it is uncertain how new provisions on intercountry adoption will affect
domestic laws such as this. See Stanley, supra note 57, at A12; cf. Martha Shirk &
Mark Schlinkmann, Door Reopens for Americans Seeking Russian Babies, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATC H, Feb. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
(noting law passed by Russian Parliament on February 10, 1995 may make
intercountry adoption even easier than before).
79 Dyuzheva, supra note 64, at 237.
80 Id.
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tion of abandonment, gives precedence to parental interests.8 ' However,
as will be discussed later, American courts are moving towards a greater
respect for children's rights, even when those rights are directly opposite
to the interests of biological parents. Biological parents' rights are no
longer guaranteed by the courts.s2 Therefore, American legislatures
should follow suit and eliminate regulations which automatically favor
parental interests over the interests of children. 83
3. United Nations Actions Regarding Intercountry Adoption
Recently, over sixty countries signed the United Nations Convention
on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption (Convention).' It is hoped this instrument will facilitate the
adoption of children across national borders and eliminate the problems
of baby brokering and bureaucracies. Although this document has a
number of positive aspects, it is somewhat vague and still untested.
The Convention recognizes the importance of raising a child in a family
environment, yet also states that internal placement is preferable to
intercountry adoption.85 This notion of prioritizing internal placement,
while laudatory in its attempt to keep children in a familiar environment
8L See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 16 (noting state and parents have legal
superiority over child in deciding what is in child's interest); P~rez-Pefia, supra note
31, at B1 (citing a "bureaucracy that is fixated on returning [children] to their natural
parents"); see also Dyuzheva, supra note 64, at 237 (stating Russian system ignores
parental rights).
82 Elizabeth Bartholet, Address at the Duke University Law School Symposium on
Family Law (May 9, 1994).
83 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F) (1990); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2 (d)(1)(viii) (1990); see also
Bogard, supra note 3, at 599-603; Pdrez-Pefia, supra note 31, at B9 (stating that
"[t]here has to be a point where you give up on parents who have given up on their
kids"). However, this presumption in favor of biological parents in American statutes
may be overcome by the provisions of the Convention, which gives the sending
country the power to define abandonment. Convention on Intercountry Adoption,
supra note 8, art. 4. America, as a primarily receiving state, will therefore not be
involved in decisions regarding the definition of abandonment. However, some
sending countries may have equally pro-parent provisions which are not addressed by
the Convention on Intercountry Adoption and which may limit the number of
children to become available for adoption. While parental interests should not be
dismissed completely, they should be tempered so that children are not at the mercy
of their biological parents. One way to avoid that problem is to give children a voice
of their own in the adoption process.
84 Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, pmbl. Unfortunately, the
instrument may take years to be ratified domestically. Bogert, supra note 56, at 78-79.
85 Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, pmbl. This instrument
does not state that foster care in the child's home state is preferable to intercountry
adoption, however, which leaves open the argument that adoption anywhere is
superior to foster care. But cf. 1989 Convention, supra note 9, art. 21(b) (stating that
internal foster care is preferred over intercountry adoption).
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whenever possible, could be used to unnecessarily restrict intercountry
adoption. It would be better if the Convention limited the amount of
time that a country was able to prioritize internal adoption, after which
period intercountry adoption would be given the same status as domestic
foster care.86 If such a provision is not added, the tension between the
two stated objectives of the Convention may- create problems in the
future if a prospective adoptive parent from another country attempts to
prioritize intercountry adoption over internal foster care.
The logistical problem of numerous bureaucracies and governmental
agencies is solved in the Convention by the creation of Central Authori-
ties in all signatory states. The purpose of the Central Authorities is to
facilitate adoption of and by residents of their states. Through this new
option, the United Nations hopes to avoid some of the independent bro-
kering problems of the past. 7
The Convention places the duty of determining whether a child is
adoptable on the state of origin.8" By allowing only one country to
decide whether a child is adoptable, the Convention seems to avoid the
problem of competing definitions of abandonment or consent. The
receiving state determines whether the adopted parents are suitable,
although the sending state may review the decision and revoke an adop-
tion if the adoption is to take place in the sending country and has not yet
86 This approach would be similar to the Indian one month moratorium on
intercountry adoption, which gives adequate but not excessive preferential treatment
to domestic adoption. See Pandit, supra note 58, at 268. A limitation on prioritization
of domestic placement would not mandate intercountry adoption after the term of
domestic preferability; it would only recognize the child's eligibility to be adopted by
foreign parents. The American system has also recognized the need to move quickly
in adoption proceedings, and requires a permanency plan to be instituted within 18
months of a child's placement in foster care. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1991). However,
18 months is half a lifetime to a 3 year old child, and an eternity to pre-teens. Cf
Ryan, supra note 26, at 281 & n.44 (arguing that foster care is harmful if used for
extended periods of time).
Russia has also recently decided to prioritize domestic adoptions by creating a
computer network to facilitate matches between prospective Russian parents and
adoptive children. See Stanley, supra note 57, at A12. Unfortunately, many experts
feel it will take years to implement such a system, during which time external
adoptions will virtually cease to occur. Id. But cf Shirk & Schlinkmann, supra note
78.
87 Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, arts. 6-13; see also Forrell,
supra note 42 (citing Australian support for governmentally regulated intercountry
adoption rather than private adoption); Todd, supra note 40 (stating that many
children who were neither orphaned nor abandoned were adopted by wealthy
foreigners).
88 Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, art. 4. The concept of
consent is not forgotten in this new document. Necessary parental consents should be
informed, voluntary, and not induced by payment. Id. Where applicable, the consent
of the child shall be sought as well. Id.
1995]
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occurred. 9 The receiving state cannot refuse to recognize an adoption
unless it is manifestly against public policy.9" Only time will tell if this
Convention solves all of the problems of intercountry adoption, but it is
certainly an effort in the right direction.
III. CHILDREN'S VOICES IN THE ADOPTION PROCESS
A. The History of the Children's Rights Movement
For years, children have competed with both state and parental inter-
ests in the adoption process. 91 At first, parents were given almost com-
plete freedom to decide what to do with their children, with the state only
intervening to protect the children when parental conduct exceeded the
community's accepted norms of behavior.92 In cases concerning orphans,
the state often made its decision without consulting the child.9" Within
the last thirty years or so, the children's rights movement has dramatically
increased children's voices in the legal proceedings that affect them.94
Today, a child is appointed a guardian ad litem whose sole purpose is to
look out for the child's best interest in legal proceedings.95
Some commentators have credited Hillary Rodham Clinton with writ-
ing some of the earliest and perhaps most influential pieces in favor of
children's rights.96 Her initial three-tiered approach advocated giving
children more control over the important decisions in their lives by (1)
abolishing the presumption of legal incapacity due to minority, (2) grant-
ing children the same procedural rights as are given adults whenever legal
action is taken against them, and (3) rejecting the presumption of unity of
interests between the parent and the child when it can be proven that the
child has independent interests and the competency to assert those inter-
ests.97 Although many considered Clinton's approach noteworthy,
neither the courts nor the legislatures have adopted it wholeheartedly.9"
89 Id arts. 5, 21.
90 Id art. 24. However, a broad, parent-oriented definition of public policy could
ruin the Convention's efforts to eliminate the problems concerning definitions of
consent and abandonment.
91 John E. Coons et al., Deciding What's Best for Children, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 465, 471 (1993); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 16.
92 Hafen, supra note 12, at 427.
93 HAwEs, supra note 10, at 7-9, 96. As was stated previously, children over a
certain age (usually 14) had a voice in choosing their guardians. Id. at 7-8.
94 Id. at 96-97.
95 Id at 113-14.
96 Hafen, supra note 12, at 433.
97 Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. EDUC. REV. 487, 507
(1973).
98 See Hafen, supra note 12, at 434-36 (discussing problems with Rodham's
proposals).
HeinOnline  -- 13 B.U. Int'l L. J. 178 1995
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
However, procedural protections are increasing99 and the presumption of
unity of interests is decreasing as children's ability to engage attorneys on
their own behalf grows.100 As of yet, no move has been made to abolish
the presumption of legal incapacity, although some would argue that chil-
dren's ability to hire attorneys is evidence of change in this direction.
Most agree that the children's rights movement is an outgrowth of the
civil and women's rights movements of the 1960s, but it is certain that the
Supreme Court has never extended to children the same range of consti-
tutional fights and protections it has afforded women and minority
groups.'0 1 Instead, children have been given the right of decisionmaking
in some limited circumstances, such as in abortion cases.1 2 If children
can be trusted to make such momentous decisions as whether to continue
or terminate a pregnancy (something girls as young as twelve or thirteen
must do with increasing frequency), then certainly they should be able to
decide whether they wish to terminate ties with biological parents so that
they may be eligible for intercountry adoption.
B. Definitions and Goals of the Children's Rights Movement
A consensus has never been reached as to the appropriate definition of
children's rights, nor have experts agreed on the goals that the children's
rights movement should have. Instead, rights advocates usually take one
of two positions: that of the liberationists or that of the protectionists.
While both camps contend they are acting in the best interest of children,
they support opposing means to that end, with one theory supporting
independent decisionmaking by children while the other does not.
1. The Liberationist Theory
Child liberationists believe children should have virtually the same
rights that adults possess, and would erase many of the legal distinctions
between children and adults. 3 Clinton's views would easily fit within
99 A line of cases beginning with In re Gault exemplify this trend toward greater
procedural protection for children. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (providing for due
process and the right to counsel in juvenile court); see also Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-13 (1969) (recognizing juveniles' First
Amendment rights for the first time). But see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633, 650
(1979) (noting children lie within the protection of the Constitution yet requiring
either judicial or parental consent prior to a minor's obtaining an abortion).
100 But cf. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating a child who had successfully brought suit on his own behalf in the lower
courts did not have standing).
101 Hafen, supra note 12, at 441-42.
102 Id. at 442; see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (requiring
parental consent or judicial determination that the girl's choice should be upheld).
103 HAwEs, supra note 10, at 115. John Holt, a supporter of children's rights,
proposed a list of 11 rights that should be granted to children. Id. at 116. Among
1995]
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the liberationist model, since she supports children's capacity to act as
legal persons. Liberationists feel that children's greatest enemy is the sys-
tem that has been put in place to protect them, and that the social and
institutional discrimination and oppression of children stunt their devel-
opment and cause them their greatest harm.104 Those who believe in the
liberationist approach doubt that parents or other adults can truly act in a
child's best interest, and instead believe the best way to safeguard the
quality of child care is to pass the control to the child.1" 5
2. The Protectionist Theory
Child protectionists, on the other hand, support some rights for chil-
dren, but are less inclined to grant full autonomy to young people.0 6
Protectionists are strongly opposed to the liberationist model, and believe
that child safety requires a much higher degree of control than liberation-
ists advocate.' 7 Supporters of the protectionist movement are often
childcare workers who lobby for legislative solutions to issues of juvenile
concern.108 Whereas liberationists focus on the rights of the individual
child, protectionists look at systemic abuses of children and work to bring
about change on a more institutional scale.109
3. A Comparison of the Two Theories
Both models have their critics. Protectionists are most often attacked
as being part of the problem, as perpetrators of a system of oppression. 10
Liberationists have been subject to more varied and vehement attacks,
possibly because they are challenging the status quo, threatening those
who are only comfortable with traditional ways of thinking and dealing
these rights is "the right to seek and choose guardians other than one's own parents
and to be legally dependent on them." Id& Presumably, this would include not only
the right to consent to adoption but the right to terminate biological parents' rights as
well.
104 Id. at 115-17.
105 Id at 117; Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 20-21; see also David A.J. Richards, The
Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, 23-28 (1980) (noting only a few cases in which the Constitution justifies
paternalistic limit.,; on the rights of minors); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Warren and
Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child Conflict Resolution: A Comparative
Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 461, 501 (1985) (stating
children should be subject to the same legal standards as adults unless special
circumstances exist).
106 HAwEs, supra note 10, at 117-18.
107 Id. at 115, 117.
108 Id. at 118.
109 See id. at 118-20.
130 Id. at 116-18.
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with children."' Some anti-liberationists believe that if children are
granted a broad range of rights, they would be free to do whatever they
wished, including quitting school, disobeying parents, and leaving home
at an early age." Theorists note that if the liberationist argument is car-
ried to its logical extreme, then parents should be equally able to leave a
family they are dissatisfied with as are the children."' They also point
out that it is unhelpful to grant children the right to live on their own if
the children are unable to support themselves financially." 4
Nevertheless, the anti-liberationists go too far in their rhetoric. It is
not necessary to carry an argument to its extreme in order to find validity
in it. One means of fulfilling the liberationists' desire to give children a
louder voice in their futures while still addressing protectionists' concerns
is to give children the capacity to control their lives, but in discrete meas-
ures. Such measures would strike a compromise between protectionists
- who see adults, whether parents or guardians ad litem, as the most
effective arbiters of what is best for children - and liberationists - who
think children should have absolute and irrevocable decisionmaking
capacity in all matters. Although this has already happened to some
extent (as in abortion cases), there needs to be an explicit recognition of
the circumstances under which children can make decisions for them-
selves. Additionally, society should recognize that children are able to
make these decisions at younger ages than is commonly supposed;" 5 in a
number of international instruments, ten is recognized as the age of con-
sent to a particular adoption,"' and should be considered a gauge for the
ability to terminate parental rights as well.
To implement these increased rights, children could be granted a type
of decisional competency similar to the decisional competencies recog-
111 See id. at 115. One commentator makes the point that advocates for children's
rights only prevail when their claims "coincide with politically powerful adult
interests." Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 89. This may be one reason why liberationists
are under more vigorous attack than protectionists; liberationists defy state and
parental authority over children, while protectionists support it.
112 See LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTEREST? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL
RiGHTS FOR CHILDREN 127-29 (1992).
"13 Id. at 129.
114 Id. at 130. However, economically dependent adults do not have their rights
taken away from them. Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 96-97.
115 Children in troubled third-world countries may be even more grown up than
are American children. For example, in Somalia, children in their early teens are
toting guns and waging war. Richburg, supra note 43. By age five, these children
"'ha[ve] seen more war, death and tragedy than any of these' aid workers from other
countries." Id. In Uganda, 13 year olds become heads of households after their
parents die of AIDS. Lorch, supra note 7. For a discussion of "maturity" in the
context of the United States Constitution, see Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 86-88.
116 See, e.g., Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, art. 4(d)(1).
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nized in other areas of the law.117 In this case, it is proposed that children
who are effectively orphaned through parental death or desertion be
allowed to make certain decisions regarding their opportunities for adop-
tion. It is disingenuous to claim that a complete breakdown of the family
will result if this type of decisional competency is recognized, since in
these cases the family no longer exists. In fact, this proposition is
extremely pro-family, as are a number of liberationist concepts. 118 In
addition, this decisional competency does not propose that all children
should have an absolute voice in all family matters. Anti-liberationists
make a good point when they note that children who wield too much
power within the family structure can cause themselves harm.1 19 The
most common scenario is the child whose parents are divorced, and who
uses blackmail -to pit one parent against the other in order to get what he
or she wants: better clothes, more toys, fewer household chores.120 The
possibility of this type of misapplication of children's rights should not
affect a child's right to be heard in intercountry adoption, however,
because juvenile coercion is not an issue in cases where the family no
longer exists due to parental death or desertion.
C. Children's Rights in Western Countries
Despite all the legal and theoretical posturing about what should and
could occur in family law matters, children's right to be heard in court is
increasing, particularly in Western countries. The nations which have had
the most recent and visible activity in the area of children's rights are the
117 Lois A. Weithorn, Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own
Welfare: Guidelines for Professionals, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 235,
243 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983). In adjudicating decisional competency, a court
investigates whether a person who normally falls into a suspect class (such as a
juvenile or mentally incapacitated adult) is capable of making decisions in a discrete
area. For an example of decisional competency in other areas of the law, see RALPH
REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 816-
17 (1990) (stating psychiatric patients are often evaluated to establish their
competency to make decisions regarding medical treatment, financial matters, and
other areas which affect their lives). To date, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that children have the right and the capacity to have a voice in at least one
type of far-reaching decision, namely whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 643 (1979). See Weithorn, supra, at 243-45 for a discussion of various tests of
juvenile competency.
118 See Holt's list of proposed rights in HAWES, supra note 10, at 116. These rights
recognize the importance of a child being raised in a family, and are pro-family in that
sense. However, Holt's proposals are not limited by a traditional definition of family,
which may be the reason behind much of the opposition to this type of liberationist
theory.
119 PURDY, supra note 112, at 139-40.
120 Id. at 141-42.
HeinOnline  -- 13 B.U. Int'l L. J. 182 1995
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
United States and the United Kingdom. Although it does not seem at
this time that these rights have been extended to children in developing
countries, particularly those countries which have an excess of adoptable
children, it is possible and in many respects desirable that these rights
eventually be granted to the children who need them the most.
1. The United States
In the United States, the impetus for legal change is coming from the
courts. In a number of cases, children have terminated parental rights, a
fact scenario which often increases the emotional tenor of the litigation
and the amount of subsequent publicity. In what has been touted as a
landmark case, Kingsley v. Kingsley involved a twelve year old boy who
was "divorcing" his biological mother in favor of his foster parents. 2'
The case's importance was not as much in the subject matter of the litiga-
tion, but in the procedural posture it took: the boy hired the attorney in
his own right. 2 It is this sort of legal independence that encourages
some children's rights advocates and discourages others. In the past, chil-
dren's preferences in cases such as these have been made known through
guardians ad litem.' - Perhaps one reason why judges and parents are
more comfortable with guardians ad litem bringing suits rather than indi-
vidual children doing so is because they feel a guardian will apply an
adult perspective to what is in the child's best interest. When children
bring suit by and for themselves, some adults fear the children will not act
in their own best interest and the law will be unable to stop them124
However, this concern is illusory, since the courts still have some respon-
sibility to the child, and will not willingly abandon their role as safekeeper
of minors.
121 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Although
many in the media hyped this case as revolutionary, some commentators have noted
that the procedure itself, namely the termination of the biological parent's rights, is
very common, though is usually instigated by the foster parents. HARALAmBIE, supra
note 22, at 199.
122 Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 782; Sarah Tippit, Boy in "Divorce" Suit Says He Wants
to Stay with Foster Family, REUTER LIBRARY REP., Sept. 25,1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ARCNWS File. However, the appellate court decided the lower court
had committed an error, though a harmless one, in allowing Gregory to file suit on his
own behalf. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 785. For a discussion of the Kingsley case, see
generally George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K.:" A Child's
Right to be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365 (1993); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 108.
123 HARALAMBIE, supra note 22, at 199; see also Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784 (citing
Florida cases and policy supporting the appointment of a guardian).
124 Some commentators also raise the issue of manipulation of a child client by an
attorney and the child's ability to pay; however, many adult clients are subject to the
same problems, and no outcry is made on their behalf. Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 108
& n.578.
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Another reason why there may be continued resistance to the idea of
children suing in their own right is because as children's voices in the
courtroom become increasingly loud, other interests, including parental
interests, necessarily suffer.' However, in other matters the courts have
not hesitated to enforce one party's rights merely because the other party
will suffer; in fact, most litigation results in a "zero sum equation," forcing
one party to win at the other's expense. Children should no longer be
viewed as their biological parents' possessions; 26 they are individuals in
their own right. Therefore, neither of these two articulable concerns is a
legitimate reason to limit responsible and competent children's access to
the courts.
Another American child, Kimberly Mays, also won the right to termi-
nate the rights of her biological parents.127 In this factually unique case,
Kimberly Mays was born to Regina and Ernest Twigg, but was taken
home by Robert Mays and his wife, whom she considered her real par-
ents for the first nine years of her life. 8 When the mix-up was discov-
ered, the Twiggs were granted visitation rights, causing Kimberly great
distress. 9 Eventually she sued to stop all contact between her and the
Twiggs, and won.'30
The key to these cases is the determination by the courts that biology
alone does not determine parentage. 13 1 Instead, the judicial system has
begun to recognize the concept of psychological parenthood, and to
award custody on that basis."3 2 Psychological parenthood is a concept
125 Id. at 89.
126 See Bartholet, supra note 82.
127 Custody and Caring, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 23, 1993, at 18.
128 Id.
129 Gall Appleson, Mays Case Raises Questions About Children's Rights, REUTERS,
Aug. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
130 Id. Since the case was decided, Kimberly has suffered some setbacks in her
relationship with Robert Mays. Wiflliam Booth, Tangled Family Ties and Children's
Rights: Teen's Change of Mind Revives Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1994, at A3.
However, this estrangement should not be used as an argument against children being
able to decide for themselves which families they live with, but as evidence that the
courts are more likely to support those decisions. Also, the facts of this case are
unique and give rise to suspicions that the emotional trauma of the discovery of her
birth parents and ensuing litigation was what caused Kimberly's problems, not the
mere fact of choosing one set of parents over another. Id. By forcing visitation rights
to the Twiggs against Kimberly's wishes (and in effect forcing Kimberly to
acknowledge two sets of parents), the courts themselves may have created the
problems.
131 Id. Elizabeth Bartholet has also recognized that the importance of genetic
parentage is decreasing in most areas of law except surrogacy cases. Bartholet, supra
note 82.
132 Id.; see also Florida Verdict Confirms Recognition of Children's Rights by
Courts is Increasing: Top Matrimonial Lawyers Say Consistency & Guidelines
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born in the field of developmental psychology, and refers to the nurturing
and caregiving that allows a child to bond with a caregiver. 133 Some com-
mentators recognize that it is psychological ties that make a family, not
biological ones."3 If we are truly concerned with the best interests of a
child, then we will respect the psychological, not merely biological, bonds
within a family. The result of these two Florida cases is an increased flex-
ibility in legal standards. For perhaps the first time, courts are recogniz-
ing that children's voices in custody and adoption hearings must be heard,
since only the children involved can decide who is their psychological par-
ent. "'35 Accordingly, courts are allowing children to terminate unwanted
biological ties and to bring actions themselves instead of waiting for
another party to bring it for them.
2. The United Kingdom
Family law in the United Kingdom is also changing, but in this instance
the responsible party is the legislature, not the judiciary. In October
1991, the Children Act, which grants children the right to sue on their
own behalf in matters of family law, went into full effect. 3 6 Soon after,
several children brought actions to force their parents to act in certain
ways. Unlike the American cases, the British cases did not always
involve termination of parental rights. Instead, some of the British chil-
dren sued for increased involvement and contact with their parents. For
example, eleven year old Aaron Wilson and his ten year old sister Nicole
used the law to obtain a court order to get their father to spend more
time with them.'37 Of course, some children did use the Act to escape
unpleasant home environments or unfit biological parents. 3 ' However,
some of these placements were to other adult relatives, thus retaining and
Lacking, PR NEWsWIRE, Aug. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
133 See HAwEs, supra note 10, at 103; Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 81; see also supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
134 See HAWES, supra note 10, at 103.
135 A child need not be able to verbalize his or her preferences in order for a court
to take them into account. See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 83. A child's acts can be
just as or even more dispositive than words. See id.
136 Fiona Millar, Children: A Law that Cares at Last, GUARDIAN, Jan. 4, 1993, at
E10. The United Kingdom is also contemplating additional adoption reforms,
including changes in intercountry adoption, which should be brought before
Parliament in the fall of 1994. Clare Dyer, Children to be Given More Say in
Adoption, GUARDIAN, July 12, 1993, at 4. For a draft of the proposed new law, see
UK Department of Health, Review of Adoption Law Published, REUTER TEXTLINE,
Oct. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
137 Lawrence Donegan, See You in Court, Dad, GUARDIAN, May 18, 1993, at 16.
138 See id. (discussing 13 year old girl seeking to leave adoptive family to rejoin her
natural father); Millar, supra note 136 (discussing 14 year old girl asking to live with
boyfriend's parents instead of father, 15 year old girl asking to live with grandparents
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strengthening family bonds. The Act seems to follow the theories of the
child liberationists, although it is yet to be seen how the law will be fully
interpreted by the British courts. Unfortunately, initial reports indicate
that the judiciary is unwilling to allow children the full range of their stat-
utory rights and has taken control of a number of cases away from the
children who initiated the cases and given it to guardians. 13 9
IV. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE AcTION
Part II of this Article dealt with the fact that there are far too many
orphans in the world and that many of these children are unable to find
loving homes because of legal barriers imposed by their governments.
Part III introduced the possibility that children, at least in some Western
countries, can sue to terminate the rights of biological parents. This sec-
tion suggests that one way to address the international problem of
orphans is to introduce the nascent system of children's rights to non-
Western countries. The premise is that children everywhere should have
the right to sue on their own behalf to better their lives. Not only should
they be able to sue to create new family environments through adoption,
but they should also be able to sue to terminate parental rights. Despite
the fact that numerous countries and nongovernmental organizations
have recognized the need for children to be raised in a family environ-
ment, the fact remains that some countries have more children than can
be adopted internally. These children need homes, and intercountry
adoption is a viable opportunity. Unfortunately, bureaucratic obstacles
to intercountry adoption force children to remain in institutions far
longer than is necessary. Prolonged stays in orphanages or foster homes
harm these children physically and emotionally. Additionally, each pass-
ing month and year makes the children older and less likely to be placed,
since adoptive parents often prefer infants or young children. If the legal
community is to help these children, it must empower them.
Not every child is able to make these sorts of decisions. Certainly older
children who are currently allowed to grant or withhold consent to an
adoption should be given the opportunity to voice their concerns about
terminating parental rights and about the possibility of leaving their
home countries. Some younger children (for example, those ages four to
ten) may be able to make or influence decisions regarding their own wel-
fare as well.14 'Courts might use a sliding scale of intelligence and experi-
ence, such as that used in determining whether a child is competent to
instead of mother; 11 year old girl asking to live with former foster parents instead of
mother).
139 See The Voice of the Children, GUARDIAN, Apr. 21, 1993, at 23.
140 See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 86-88; see also supra note 135. In a liberal
courtroom, the age of self-determinism may drop even lower.
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testify at trial. 4 ' It is obvious, for example, that infants cannot be asked
to make these life-altering decisions for themselves.
A. Older Children
In this context, "older" is a relative term. In cases where a child is
above the age of consent, the courts in that country should treat that
child's wishes as dispositive as to whether he or she will be eligible for
intercountry adoption. To echo the words of the Convention on
Intercountry Adoption, the state should only withhold adoption if it is
"manifestly contrary to public policy."142 As has been illustrated by the
cases of children suing on their own behalf in the United States and the
United Kingdom, juveniles are well able to weigh the benefits and risks
involved in an adoption, even an intercountry adoption, and should be
allowed to act accordingly. The state should not be able to keep a child in
an orphanage or put him or her in a foster home indefinitely if the child is
adamantly against it. In many cases, an adult point of view may be in
direct opposition to the child's best interest. For example, some adults
can be prejudiced against intercountry adoption because of their own
fears of other cultures or because of their own concerns about the future
of their country if too many children leave. 43 This type of prejudice can
sentence a child to an orphanage forever.
In addition to making their wishes known as to eligibility for intercoun-
try adoption, children who are in an orphanage despite the fact that one
or both parents are or may be alive should be able to sue to terminate any
parental rights the biological parents may still retain. This right should be
granted due to the fact that lack of consent or the absence of clear-cut
abandonment may be what is forcing the child to live in an endless purga-
tory of orphanages and foster homes. Enabling children to act on their
own behalf would actually eliminate the problem of baby brokering,
which has been touted internationally as the greatest evil associated with
141 Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 14 (noting some commentators' support for ad hoc
determinations of juvenile maturity).
142 See Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, art. 24. This public
policy should not be determined by mere nationalistic concerns about diminishing
populations or imperialistic Westerners; instead, there should be a global perspective
on whether an international public policy has been breached. Clearly there will be
concerns about the proper balance of national sovereignty and the role of
nongovernmental organizations, but the human rights aspects of this matter should
not be ignored merely because children are unable to organize a public plea for legal
assistance.
143 See Pandit, supra note 58, at 271; Bogard, supra note 3, at 582; see also Forrell,
supra note 42. "[P]arents and the state tend to perceive only those claims which serve
adult purposes and protect adult interests." Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 17. Instead of
viewing children's views as "inferior," perhaps they should be seen as merely
"different." Id.
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intercountry adoption.1' Once a child has been given the right to termi-
nate family ties, biological parents no longer have complete control over
the child and are no longer able to hold the child "hostage" until a pro-
spective parent has paid some type of "ransom." Although this concept
may sound heartless or unfair to the parents, remember that the cases
under consideration here are those where the adult is either unable to be
located (and perhaps dead) or has already abandoned the child to an
orphanage. To leave the child stranded in an unfit institution for life is a
far greater cruelty than allowing for the termination of parental rights.
Therefore, children of sufficient mental and emotional capacity should be
given an explicit right to terminate parental rights and declare themselves
eligible for intercountry adoption. This right should be recognized even
though the Convention on Intercountry Adoption seems to have eradi-
cated the problems associated with dual consent and abandonment. In
the first place it is unclear how various countries, especially the United
States, will implement the Convention. Secondly, not every country has
become a signatory to the Convention. If we are truly in favor of acting
in the best interests of children, then we will do all we can to facilitate
their finding homes somewhere.
For younger children,145 the courts must review the child's competency
to determine whether the child is able to make the decision to be eligible
for intercountry adoption. The court's determination should include an
analysis of whether the child should be able to terminate parental rights.
In some cases, it may be appropriate to appoint a guardian ad litem, and
to factor in adult perceptions of what is in the child's best interests. How-
ever, the courts should not immediately assume that it is in the child's
best interests to live in foster care in the home country rather than be
adopted elsewhere. If a child suspects that the court or the guardian is
not acting in his or her best interests, that child should be able to sue to
assert his or her wishes more forcefully. If it becomes apparent that a
certain country is habitually overruling children's wishes without proper
consideration, perhaps a neutral body such as the United Nations should
144 See Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, art. 4(3); Liu, supra
note 1, at 194.
145 There really should be no bright-line rule regarding legal incapacity, beyond
which a child's opinion is totally disregarded. See Rodham, supra note 97, at 507.
Some liberationists believe a child's viewpoint should be dispositive from the time the
child can speak, but the more rational position would be to apply a balancing test that
gives the child's voice more weight as he or she becomes more mature. The younger
the child is, the more the state will be involved in the decision-making process,
although always in consultation with the child. See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 83. In
theory, this is the basic test now in place, but courts seem to have an unspoken belief
that many children do not know what is best for them, and that parental interests
should be given great respect. See id. at 16-17. The automatic primacy given to
parental rights is one of the legal assumptions which should be eliminated. See
generally DyuzheN'a, supra note 64, at 237 (noting the Russian approach).
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step in to review the decisions or to provide a court of final appeal. How-
ever, these solutions may be far too costly and complex for a child from
an underdeveloped nation to understand and utilize.
B. Infants
Infants have one advantage in adoption proceedings and one disadvan-
tage. Their advantage is that they are the most desirable candidates for
adoption, so they are most likely to be adopted within their home
state. 146 For many infants, the issue of intercountry adoption will never
arise. The disadvantage of their situation is that they are too young to
voice an opinion in any matter concerning them.
When dealing with infants, it is obvious that the court will have to
appoint a guardian to make decisions that are in the best interest of the
child. However, the courts should adopt the approach as to what is in the
best interest of the child that is suggested here, allowing him or her to
leave the country if that is the best opportunity for a happy, productive
future. In the past, biological parents have been able to thwart children's
opportunities, either by refusing to consent to adoption or by abandoning
children without properly terminating parental rights. These children can
languish in an institution for years. Infants who were once easily adopta-
ble become more difficult to place the older they get. Nations with an
overabundance of homeless children should take heed of the increasing
importance of children's rights, and not give absolute precedence to the
rights of biological parents. There are times when it is in the best interest
of the child to sever biological ties, even when the parent disagrees with
or is unaware of that action. This is not to say that parents' rights should
be terminated immediately upon their leaving their child for temporary
care in an orphanage. If the parent is given notice that, as in Russia, a
six-months' absence will result in legal abandonment,147 parental rights
have been duly respected. Courts should apply this standard even when
the child is an infant, if it is the only way the child will have a chance to
grow up happy and healthy. Of course, this view does not advocate ter-
mination of parental rights when the parent is involuntarily kept from
asserting them.' 8
146 But consider countries such as China, where 98% of the orphanage population
is female. There, even healthy baby girls are unlikely to be adopted due to the
cultural bias in favor of sons and the governmental obstacles to families with more
than one child. See Bartholet, supra note 82. In a nation where mortality rates for
children in orphanages reach 20-70%, intercountry adoption is the only hope these
children have for a normal life - or for any kind of life at all. See id
147 Dyuzheva, supra note 64, at 237.
148 See Convention on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 8, art. 4(4).
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V. CONCLUSION
The orphaning of a child through parental death or desertion is a diffi-
cult thing to deal with for everyone. In the past, courts and state agencies
have done their best to find homes for orphaned children, but it is time to
recognize that not every country can support all of the homeless children
left in its care. Intercountry adoption is a viable solution to these coun-
tries' problems.
Although recent international conventions have created a system
which facilitates intercountry adoption, there is still more to be done.
More countries should follow the lead of the United States and the
United Kingdom, and give children more of a voice in decisions which
affect them. Children should be allowed to terminate parental rights
when necessary, thus allowing them to be adopted by parents from their
own country or from other countries. Only by refuting the paternalistic
and protectionist views of the past - views which give biological parents
the nearly absolute right to determine their children's future despite the
parents' inability to care for those children - can we begin to truly work
in children's best interests.
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